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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATIONS:
PRESERVING A PROMPT AND ORDERLY






Congress possesses the inherent constitutional authority to inquire into all
matters that potentially may be the subject of legislation.1 This investigatory
authority, however, would be quite meaningless absent "some means of com-
pulsion .. . to obtain what is needed." 2 Accordingly, Congress has the
power, also inherent in the Constitution, to issue investigatory subpoenas
and punish witnesses who fail to comply therewith.3 In addition, Congress
has enacted legislation whereby a recalcitrant witness is certified as being in
contempt of Congress, and the case is forwarded to a United States Attorney
for criminal prosecution.'
One of the most important areas of congressional inquiry relates to over-
sight of the Executive Branch.5 Although there is arguably no constitutional
impediment to the use of compulsion against an Executive Branch official
* B.A. 1970, Franklin and Marshall College; J.D. 1974, Georgetown University Law
Center. Mr. Brand is former General Counsel to the Clerk, United States House of
Representatives.
** A.B. 1980, Fairfield University; J.D. 1983, The Catholic University School of Law.
1. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
2. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
3. Id. at 160, 174. The authority of Congress to punish witnesses for contempt is dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 11-46.
4. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 11-46.
5. Cf Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (congressional investigatory power "comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste"); Van
Alstyne, Congressional Investigations, 15 F.R.D. 471, 474 (1954) ("The very possibility that a
government official may be called to account for his stewardship before a Congressional inves-
tigating committee undoubtedly exerts a beneficent influence for more responsible
administration.").
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who has refused to comply with a congressional subpoena, 6 there are never-
theless several practical constraints in such a case, especially where the re-
calcitrant witness is a high-ranking official claiming executive privilege.
These constraints were illustrated by the recent confrontation between mem-
bers of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Attorney General during the
confirmation hearings of William Rehnquist for Chief Justice of the United
States.7 Executive privilege issues have been also lurking during the recent
congressional inquiries into the Reagan administration's arms shipments to
Iran.8 The problems in this area were, however, most dramatically illus-
trated by the confrontation between Congress and the executive branch re-
garding the legal obligation of former Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford to deliver documents that had been
subpoenaed by a House of Representatives subcommittee.9
This Article will discuss a legislative solution to resolve controversies in
which legislative demands for information are disobeyed by executive branch
officials. Part I of the Article will examine the current mechanisms available
to Congress to enforce its demands for information. Part II will focus upon
constitutional confrontations between the executive and legislative branches
stemming from congressional demands for information. It will accord close
scrutiny to the Burford controversy, which graphically illustrated that ex-
isting enforcement mechanisms are incapable of resolving such conflicts.
Part III will discuss and critique proposals' ° aimed at improving the present
situation. Finally, Part IV will discuss legislation that would provide for
appointment of a special prosecutor in cases where a high-ranking executive
official has thwarted the legislative will by refusing to produce materials de-
manded by Congress. The Article will conclude that a special prosecutor
provision, in conjunction with Congress' inherent contempt power and its
statutory authority to initiate a process leading to criminal prosecutions,
provides the most effective means for resolving conflicts between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government.
6. See infra notes 85, 94.
7. See, e.g., Reagan Uses Executive Privilege to Keep Rehnquist Memos Secret, Wash.
Post, Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
8. See, e.g., Taylor, Legal Hurdles Seen in Effort for Disclosure of Iran Affair, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 47-87.
10. See, e.g., Hamilton & Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege
Disputes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (1984); Note,
The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Contro-
versy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333.
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I. CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
It has long been recognized that Congress possesses an inherent power to
punish individuals for contempts committed against it. Indeed, as early as
1796, the House of Representatives itself tried, convicted and imprisoned a
private citizen on charges of congressional bribery.1 In 1821, the Supreme
Court upheld congressional authority to punish contumacious individuals in
the landmark decision of Anderson v. Dunn. 12 Anderson involved a civil law-
suit filed by a private plaintiff against the House Sergeant at Arms seeking
damages for an arrest which plaintiff challenged as unlawful. The Court
decisively rejected plaintiff's challenge, stating that the authority of Con-
gress to punish for contempts committed against it must be inferred from the
Constitution. 13
In 1927, the Supreme Court confirmed a proposition that had been as-
sumed for almost a century14 when it held in McGrain v. Daugherty15 that
witnesses refusing to respond to legitimate inquiries from a congressional
investigatory committee could be punished by Congress for contempt. In
McGrain, the Court reversed the lower court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus that ordered the Senate Sergeant at Arms to release a contumacious
witness he had arrested. The Court stated that "the power of inquiry-with
process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legisla-
tive function."16 The "inquiry" approved in McGrain was that of a Senate
subcommittee that had subpoenaed the Attorney General's brother as part
of an investigation into whether the Department of Justice had properly han-
dled an antitrust investigation. 17 The Court stated that "[p]lainly th[is] sub-
ject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided
by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit."1"
11. See Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REV.
189, 190-91 (1967). Upon conviction at the bar of the House, the individual was placed in the
custody of the House Sergeant at Arms and remained a prisoner of the House for approxi-
mately one week. Id. at 191.
12. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
13. See id. at 225, 228-30. The Court subsequently retreated from some of the expansive
dicta in Anderson when it held in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), that Congress
has no authority to punish witnesses who refuse to answer questions relating solely to their
private affairs. See id. at 190, 195-96. A person convicted by Congress of contempt may
challenge the legality of his conviction either by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, see,
e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), or by filing a subsequent suit for money dam-
ages as was done in Anderson and Kilbourn.
14. See Moreland, supra note 11, at 219.
15. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16. Id. at 174.
17. Id. at 150-52.
18. Id. at 177.
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The direct adjudication and punishment of contempts by Congress itself
had, by 1857, become unwieldy in many cases and time consuming.' 9 Fur-
thermore, the efficacy of this inherent process was limited by the Supreme
Court's holding in Anderson that congressional authority to imprison contu-
macious witnesses expired at the end of each session of Congress.2" Accord-
ingly, in 1857, Congress enacted legislation that instructed the executive
branch to prosecute contumacious congressional witnesses in the courts and
also provided for longer and more severe penalties than Congress itself
might be able to administer, especially toward the end of a session.
2'
The Act of 1857 has become the modern-day congressional contempt stat-
ute and is now codified in the United States Code.22 Although Congress'
inherent contempt power is still extant 23 and has even been invoked in this
century, 24 it is this statute that is now almost exclusively used to punish
witnesses for contempt of Congress. The most important provisions of the
statute are sections 192 and 194. Section 192 makes it a misdemeanor crimi-
nal offense, punishable by a fine of $100 to $1,000 and imprisonment of one
month to one year, for a witness under congressional subpoena to fail to
appear or to withhold testimony or documents. 25 The procedural mecha-
nism for enforcement of this provision is codified in section 194. Under sec-
tion 194, the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House must certify
the fact of contempt "to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty
it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action. ,26
In a prosecution brought under section 192, as with any criminal prosecu-
tion, the government has the burden of proving all the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.27 Specifically, it must be demonstrated that the
witness willfully refused to comply with a subpoena request which was "per-
19. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 406 (1857) (remarks of Rep. Orr).
20. See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231. An argument could be made that this aspect of the
Anderson holding does not apply to the Senate because the Senate is a "continuing body" with
a turnover of only one-third of its membership in each Congress. See Moreland, supra note 11,
at 199 n.31. The Senate, however, apparently has acquiesced in this limitation of Anderson.
Id. See also id. at 211 n.58.
21. See Act of 1857, 11 Stat. 155 (1857). Seealso CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 406
(1857) (remarks of Rep. Orr that inherent congressional contempt power was especially inade-
quate where session of Congress was nearing adjournment).
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-196 (1982).
23. See In re Application of the United States Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 & n.27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981); United States
v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917) (arrest of United States Attorney).
25. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1982).
26. Id. § 194.
27. Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147, 151 (1958) (" '[T]he courts must accord to the
defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases.' " (quot-
[Vol. 36:71
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tinent" to a legitimate legislative objective.2" The pertinency requirement
essentially translates into two separate strands: (1) the subpoenaed testi-
mony or documents must be related to an end that Congress itself may con-
stitutionally pursue, and (2) the subpoenaed testimony or documents must
fall within the grant of authority from the Senate or House to the requesting
committee. 2 ' Although the first strand does not, as a practical matter, sig-
nificantly restrain Congress, 30 the second strand may well preclude a suc-
cessful contempt prosecution in a particular case. For example, in Tobin v.
United States,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed a defendant's conviction because the House resolu-
tion authorizing a Judiciary Committee investigation did not, in the court's
view, grant the committee authority to subpoena records of the type re-
quested.32 Assuming the government is able to prove its case, the defendant
may, of course, raise constitutional privileges as a defense,3 3 although the
availability of nonconstitutional privileges is somewhat less certain.3 4
A subpoenaed witness seeking to challenge the legitimacy of a congres-
sional demand, therefore, must generally assert such a challenge through
defense of a criminal charge. 35 The courts have rejected attempts, by either
ing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957))); see generally Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 n.16 (1975).
28. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 476, 478-79. At one point, the Supreme Court suggested
that the objective of the congressional inquiry was not an appropriate matter for judicial scru-
tiny. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225-27 (1821). Although the Court
subsequently retreated from this expansive dictum, see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
190, 195-200 (1881) (refusing to sanction congressional inquiry into purely private affairs), it
safely may be said that a modern-day witness challenging the legitimacy of the congressional
objective engages in what is essentially a "fruitless task." Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 478.
29. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1953).
30. See supra note 28.
31. 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
32. Id. at 275-76; see United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791, 801 (D. Mass. 1956)
(stating that the issue was not whether Congress could pursue such an investigation but was
rather "whether Congress gave authority to this particular Committee" to pursue the
investigation).
33. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959).
34. See generally Moreland, supra note 11, at 265-68. Furthermore, technical objections,
such as the lack of a committee quorum, are waived unless asserted timely before the commit-
tee so that it has an opportunity to cure any defect. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 333, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 991 (1950); cf Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278-81
(D.C. Cir.) (methods employed by Congress in obtaining defendant's appearance may not be
asserted as valid defense to contempt prosecution), cert. granted, 335 U.S. 857 (1948), cert.
dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949) (per curiam).
35. Sky, Judicial Review of Congressional Investigations: Is There an Alternative to Con-
tempt?, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 428-29 (1962) (answering his own question in the
negative).
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the congressional committee 36 or the subpoenaed witness,37 to avoid crimi-
nal proceedings by obtaining a ruling upon the legitimacy of the demand
through some form of civil proceeding in advance of an actual contempt
citation. In 1978, Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act,38 grant-
ing the Senate and its committees authority to seek civil enforcement of its
subpoenas from the District of Columbia federal district court.39 This Act,
however, specifically does not apply to subpoenas of federal government offi-
cials.40 Furthermore, the passage of the Act buttresses the conclusion that
civil enforcement is not available outside the context of Senate subpoenas
directed at private persons.4"
The general unavailability of a civil enforcement mechanism means that a
recalcitrant witness is "bound rightly to construe the statute" when raising
defenses to a contempt prosecution.42 Furthermore, once convicted of crim-
inal contempt, a defendant may not purge the conviction by belated compli-
ance with the subpoena.4 3 There are, however, at least two ways that a
recalcitrant witness may mitigate the potentially harsh consequences of non-
compliance in advance. First, the witness may stipulate with the prosecution
that he will comply with the subpoena if ultimately adjudged guilty, which
may allow the court to stay and suspend any eventual sentence.' Second,
the witness may be able to convince Congress to exercise its inherent con-
tempt power rather than forward the case to a United States Attorney for
36. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973) (Sirica, C.J.) (dismissing committee's attempt to obtain subpoena en-
forcement for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
37. See, e.g., Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dismissing subpoenaed
witness' complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against members of congressional
subcommittee on several grounds primarily dealing with comity). One of the most dramatic
rebuffs to a plaintiff seeking civil relief from a congressional subpoena occurred in United
States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). That case is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 46-86.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States Senate Permanent Subcomm. on In-
vestigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 n.28 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that civil enforcement of subpoenas
is unavailable to the House under the Ethics in Government Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981).
42. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929).
43. United States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126, 135-37 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
44. Such a procedure was successfully employed in United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp.




prosecution.4 5 This inherent contempt power works very much like a civil
enforcement mechanism.46 It must be stressed, however, that both of these
mitigating schemes are dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of Con-
gress, the prosecution and/or the courts.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION: THE BURFORD CASE
Congressional demands for information from the executive branch are
nothing new.47 Indeed, disputes between Congress and the President re-
garding the latter's obligation to produce requested information date back to
the administration of George Washington.4 8 Until recently, however, no
high-ranking official had ever been voted in contempt by the full House or
Senate.49 The legislative history of the congressional contempt statute nev-
ertheless makes clear that it was intended "to punish equally the Cabinet
officer and the culprit who may have insulted the dignity of th[e] House
.... "50 Furthermore, the Justice Department has recognized that instances
might arise where an executive branch official would be cited for contempt of
Congress, in which case the official would be forced to retain private
counsel.51
45. See supra notes 11-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction be-
tween Congress' inherent contempt power and the statutory contempt scheme.
46. See Contempt Proceedings Against Secretary of Commerce Rogers CB. Morton: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1975) (testimony of Prof. Raoul Berger).
47. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations in the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40
HARV. L. REV. 153, 170-75 (1926).
48. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 168, 171
(1974) (describing President Washington's refusal to comply with one document request by
House and agreement to comply with another). Historical accounts of clashes between Con-
gress and the President regarding requests by the former for information and/or documents
are contained in H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-117 (1982) (attachment C to
Minority Views) and STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
REFUSALS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS
1964-1973 (Comm. Print 1974).
49. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., LEADING CASES ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATORY POWER (Comm. Print 1976).
See generally R. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATER-
GATE (1976). In fact, there have been instances where high-ranking executive officials have
been successfully prosecuted for contempt of Congress. See, e.g., id. at 149-56 (discussing
guilty plea in United States v. Kleindienst, Cr. No. 74-256 (D.D.C. 1974)).
50. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 429 (1857) (remarks of Rep. H. Marshall).
51. See The Petroleum Import Fee: Department of Energy Oversight, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1980) (testi-
mony of Assistant Attorney General Hammond). The Assistant Attorney General stated:
The position of the Department of Justice in its representation guidelines has long
been that if, at a later time, it becames [sic] apparent that a prosecution of any official
who testifies on behalf of the executive is in order--either through perjury, or con-
1986]
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In 1982, however, a dispute broke out between a House subcommittee and
the executive branch regarding the latter's duty to provide information perti-
nent to congressional oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The confrontation eventually resulted in the citation of EPA Ad-
ministrator Anne Gorsuch Burford by the full House for contempt of Con-
gress. The Burford case is deserving of close scrutiny, both for its historical
import and for its dramatic exposure of the inadequacies in the present sys-
tem of congressional compulsion against the executive branch.
The historic dispute in the Burford case had its genesis on March 10, 1982
when the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Com-
mittee on Public Works and Transportation (Levitas subcommittee) opened
a series of hearings regarding EPA enforcement of federal environmental
statutes,52 including the so-called Superfund Act.53 These hearings, accord-
ing to a subsequent committee report, "raised a number of concerns about
the adequacy of the Superfund law, and the extent to which the EPA's ef-
forts to carry it out are both satisfactory and in keeping with the intent of the
law." 54 In a letter to EPA Administrator Gorsuch (Burford) dated Septem-
ber 15, 1982, Chairman Levitas requested that certain Superfund informa-
tion be made available to his subcommittee.5 5 Although indicating a
willingness to make some materials available to the subcommittee, EPA re-
fused to make available any materials contained in files relating to open in-
vestigations.5 6 After extensive negotiations proved unsatisfactory to the
subcommittee, it caused a subpoena to be served upon EPA Administrator
Burford on November 22, 1982."7 The subpoena required Burford to appear
tempt, or for other malfeasance-at that time it would be necessary for the official to
seek private counsel.
Id.
52. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, CONTEMPT OF CON-
GRESS, H.R. REP. No. 968, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).
53. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
54. H.R. REP. No. 968, supra note 52, at 8.
55. Id. at 12, 27 (appendix A) (copy of letter).
56. See Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and
In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 10, United States v. House of Representa-
tives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983) (Civ. No. 82-3583) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Points &
Authorities]. The Justice Department subsequently characterized the withheld materials as
"sensitive attorney work-product material," and described the documents as including
sensitive memoranda and other sensitive papers which identify parties potentially
liable under the [Superfund] Act and which discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
the government's case against them, legal issues, anticipated defenses, timetables and
other enforcement plans, negotiation and litigation strategy, the names of potential
witnesses, their anticipated testimony and other evidentiary matter.
Id.
57. H.R. REP. No. 968, supra note 52, at 13-15.
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before the subcommittee on December 2, 1982 for the purpose of giving tes-
timony and producing documents relating to EPA Superfund enforcement.5
When Burford appeared before the subcommittee on December 2, she re-
fused to produce certain documents covered by the subpoena, citing a mem-
orandum from President Reagan.59 The Levitas subcommittee then voted to
hold Burford in contempt. 60 After still further negotiations proved unsuc-
cessful, 6 1 the full committee voted, on December 10, 1982, to certify Burford
in contempt and to forward the matter to the full House for its considera-
tion.62 On December 16, 1982, the House passed, by a vote of 259 to 105, a
resolution citing Burford for contempt of Congress.63 The Speaker of the
House, acting pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194, then certified the contempt,
whereupon a copy of the certification was delivered to the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia."
Immediately after the House vote and prior to the delivery of the con-
tempt citation, however, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the
name of the United States seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
numerous House of Representatives defendants. 65 The requested relief in-
cluded an injunction that would have prevented "any further action to en-
force the outstanding subpoena" against Burford.6 6 The United States
Attorney, whose name was listed on the Justice Department complaint,6 7
declined to present the Burford matter to a grand jury, claiming that "it
would not be appropriate for me to consider bringing this matter before a
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 16. The President's memorandum to Burford stated that "sensitive documents
found in open law enforcement files should not be made available to Congress or the public
except in extraordinary circumstance." Id.; see also id. at 42-43 (appendix I) (copy of
memorandum).
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 20-23.
62. Id. at 23.
63. See H.R. RES. 632, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H10,061 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1982).
64. House of Representatives Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion
to Dismiss at 10, United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983)
(Civ. No. 82-3583) [hereinafter House Memorandum]; see also 128 CONG. REC. H10,268
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 1982) (announcement to House regarding delivery of contempt citation).
65. Complaint at 7-8, United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150
(D.D.C. 1983) (Civ. No. 82-3583) (hereinafter Complaint]. The House vote took place at
approximately 10 p.m. on the evening of December 16, and the Justice Department complaint
was filed moments thereafter in federal district court. See HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS
AND TRANSPORTATION, RELATING TO THE CONTEMPT CITATION OF ANNE M. (GORSUCH)
BURFORD, H.R. REP. No. 323, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1983).
66. Complaint, supra note 65, at 7.
67. See id. at 8.
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grand jury until the civil action has been resolved."
68
The House defendants almost immediately moved to dismiss the suit.
69
The memorandum in support of the House motion identified numerous juris-
dictional and constitutional defects in the Justice Department complaint.7 °
The barriers to suit identified by the House defendants included the speech
or debate clause71 and article III of the Constitution.72
On February 3, 1983, the court granted the House defendants' motion to
dismiss.7 3 Choosing to avoid most of the House's specific arguments, the
court instead relied upon the more generalized notion in the House memo-
randum 74 that the Justice Department lawsuit was an inappropriate vehicle
for resolving the merits of the constitutional confrontation. The court stated
that "constitutional claims and other objections to congressional investiga-
tory procedures may be raised as defenses in a criminal prosecution. ' 75 Fur-
ther, it added that resolution of the executive privilege claim would become
necessary only if Burford became a defendant in either a criminal contempt
proceeding or some other legal action initiated by Congress.76 The court,
therefore, held that the civil action should be dismissed.77 In so holding, it
distinguished United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT &
68. Letter from United States Attorney Harris to House Speaker O'Neill (Dec. 27, 1982),
reprinted in Examining and Reviewing the Procedures that Were Taken by the Office of the US.
Attorney for the District of Columbia in Their Implementation of a Contempt Citation that was
voted by the Full House of Representatives Against the then Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, Anne Gorsuch Burford, Hearing Before the Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing].
69. Motion of the House of Representatives to Dismiss and to Expedite Consideration,
United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
70. See generally House Memorandum, supra note 64.
71. Id. at 10-21. The Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 6, generally pro-
tects congressional members and officers from suit for performance of legislative acts, includ-
ing the authorization and issuance of subpoenas, if within the "legitimate legislative sphere."
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
72. House Memorandum, supra note 64, at 32-52. Article III requires that a plaintiff
have standing by virtue of having suffered some injury in fact as a result of the challenged
action. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). The House defendants claimed that any "in-
jury" caused by their actions affected only an interest of the executive branch, and hence was
constitutionally insufficient to support standing on behalf of the "United States." House Mem-
orandum, supra note 64, at 47 (citing Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (Bazelon, C.J., joined by Tamm & Wright, JJ., concurring)).
73. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 153.
74. House Memorandum, supra note 64, at 21-31.
75. 556 F. Supp. at 152. The court also noted that -[c]ourts have a duty to avoid unneces-
sarily deciding constitutional issues." Id. (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1952)).




T),7 8 in which the District of Columbia Circuit upheld jurisdiction over a
lawsuit brought by the executive branch seeking to prevent a private party
from complying with a congressional subpoena. According to the court, the
AT & T case was distinguishable because, absent a need for prior judicial
intervention in a civil context, the executive branch would never have been
able to raise its claim of executive privilege.79
The Justice Department never took an appeal from this dismissal.8" EPA
Administrator Burford resigned from her position on March 9, 1983, and
the disputed documents were turned over to a House committee that same
day upon a promise by the committee to preserve confidentiality.8 1 To date,
there has been no criminal prosecution arising from the incident.
Although Congress eventually got what it wanted, several troubling issues
remain in the wake of the Burford case. The most obvious of these is the
delay engendered by the Justice Department's civil gambit; the materials
were requested during the 97th Congress, but were not produced until the
98th Congress. Furthermore, the actions taken by executive branch officials
in response to congressional investigatory demands and the subsequent con-
tempt citation arguably manifest a questionable understanding of the proper
role of the Executive under the constitutional scheme. A primary reason
cited by the United States Attorney for his failure to heed the congressional
directive that Burford be prosecuted was the conflict that such a prosecution
would effectuate in light of the Justice Department's civil action.82 It is
somewhat disingenuous, however, for the executive branch to cite, as a basis
for nonprosecution, a conflict that was entirely of its own making. Such
disingenuousness is compounded by the Justice Department's discarding of
earlier warnings regarding the potentiality of such a conflict, claiming either
that conflicts were nonexistent
83 or that they were curable.
84
78. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
79. 556 F. Supp. at 152.
80. Hearing, supra note 68, at 29 (prepared statement of United States Attorney Harris).
81. Hoffman & Peterson, Burford Quits as EPA Administrator, Wash. Post, Mar. 10,
1983, at 1, col. 1.
82. See Hearing, supra note 68; see also Roberts, Congress's Intent Held as Violated, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 14, 1983, at A13, col. 3.
83. The potential problem was raised presciently by Chairman Levitas at the time of his
subcommittee's consideration of Administrator Burford's refusal to comply with the subpoena.
In responding to an inquiry, the Justice Department disclaimed any conflict, stating: "[w]e do
not believe that anything we have done to date or intend to do at this hearing would jeopardize
the ability of the Attorney General to discharge his responsibilities under the Constitution and
laws of the United States." Hazardous Waste Contamination of Water Resources: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (Dec. 2, 1982) (statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Theodore Olson). It also bears repeating in this regard that the concern about a potential
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In addition, Burford's underlying privilege claim was questionable at
best.8 5 Furthermore, had the court not dismissed the case on the ground
that it did, there was a host of other apparently insurmountable defects with
the Justice Department complaint which would have most likely precluded
any resolution on the merits.8 6 More importantly, the idea of the Justice
Department suing the House of Representatives on behalf of the "United
States" is of dubious constitutional validity. In this vein, Professor Laurence
Tribe was quoted as accusing the Justice Department of filing the case with
"either abject ignorance of the Constitution or contemptible cynicism about
constitutional separation of powers."8 7
conflict predates the Burford controversy and had been anticipated by the Justice Department.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also infra note 84.
84. The Justice Department had suggested earlier that retention of private counsel was
"one option available" to avoid the conundrum faced by an executive branch official advised to
withhold documents. See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RETENTION OF PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL
TO REPRESENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN CIVIL LAWSUITS, STAFF REPORT TO THE SUH-
COMM. ON ADMIN. PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG.,
2D SESS. 375-76 (Comm. Print 1978). Of course, when Administrator Burford attempted to
obtain outside counsel after it became apparent to her that the Department's hydra-headed
representation might not adequately protect her interests, the Department, without explana-
tion, terminated her authority to hire counsel. Russakoff, EPA Abruptly Cancels Plans to Hire
Lawyers, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
85. The justification for the executive branch refusal to produce open files to Congress was
a belief that Congress could not be entrusted to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive infor-
mation. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. Such a predicate, however, has been
expressly rejected by the courts because it is not, in essence, a "public disclosure" which would
represent a proper ground for refusal. See, e.g., FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626
F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979).
Furthermore, to the extent that a balancing of interests would have been necessary, see
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (public need must outweigh presumption of presidential privilege based on public inter-
est and confidentiality), the leading Supreme Court decision in this area expressly validated
congressional probes of executive branch enforcement policies. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 177-78 (1927).
In contrast, the President's interest in withholding the documents was extremely weak be-
cause the documents were produced at lower and middle bureaucratic levels, see H.R. REP.
No. 968, supra note 52, at 54, and it was unclear whether the President himself had ever
reviewed the documents. See Declaration of Robert M. Perry 22-24, Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1983). The executive privilege claim thus stood on extremely shaky constitutional ground.
See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (executive
privilege can "apply at most to the ... items with which the [President] was personally famil-
iar"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (executive privilege protects items
critical to "performance of the President's responsibilities"). The illegitimacy of the underly-
ing privilege claim in the Burford case is perhaps best illustrated by the executive's eventual
capitulation to the legislative demands.
86. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
87. Taylor, House Contempt Citation for EPA Chief is Taken to Court by Justice Depart-
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The most troubling aspects of the case, however, are not the actions of a
particular administration, but rather the systemic deficiencies in the existing
system that were brought to light. It no longer may be seriously contended
that the existing statutory system, as codified in sections 192 and 194, is
equipped to resolve disputes between Congress and the Executive, regarding
the latter's obligation to produce subpoenaed materials. The more difficult
issue is how best to modify the present statute so that an orderly and prompt
resolution of legislative/executive disputes is assured.
III. CIVIL ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM
In order to redress the shortcomings in the present system which were
highlighted by the Burford case, one commentator has urged courts to take
cognizance of civil declaratory judgment actions in such instances."8 Others
have advocated the enactment of legislation that would achieve a similar
result. For example, a recent article proposed enactment of a new statute
that would remedy "the pitfalls of using Congress' criminal contempt pow-
ers as the primary means to obtain compliance with congressional subpoenas
issued to employees and officials of the executive branch." 9 The proposed
statute would supplement current congressional enforcement options by pro-
viding federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by Con-
gress, or an authorized committee or subcommittee, seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief regarding a subpoena directed to a federal employee acting
in an official capacity.9° The authors recognize that similar proposals have
been introduced in prior sessions of Congress.9" The primary gloss placed
by the authors upon these prior proposals is a provision that would require
the federal courts to expedite consideration of any cases brought under the
statute.
92
The views of the present administration with respect to a civil enforce-
ment statute are somewhat unclear. It has been suggested that commence-
ment of the civil action in the Burford case signals a "dramatic" shift away
from the Justice Department's historic opposition to such a statute.93 It re-
ment, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 1. Professor Tribe further accused the Justice
Department of "turning the whole Constitution on its head." Id.
88. See generally Note, supra note 10.
89. Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 10, at 147.
90. Id. at 171-72.
91. Id. at 159-62 (discussing proposals that date back to 1953).
92. See id. at 165.
93. Id. at 170-71. Historically, the Justice Department has opposed the civil enforcement
concept with respect to executive/legislative conflicts, and the concept was dropped from the
Ethics in Government Act at the Department's insistence. See 123 CONG. REC. 2961, 2970
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk).
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mains to be seen, however, whether this support is institutional or instead
simply designed to address the exigencies of the moment.94
In any event, several flaws are apparent regarding these proposals to es-
tablish a civil enforcement mechanism as an alternative to the current sys-
tem of criminal contempt. The most obvious flaw is that, even with an
expediting provision, unacceptable delays are inherent in the civil process. It
bears noting in this regard that it was not until the lapse of three months and
a congressional session from the date the civil complaint was filed that the
documents eventually were produced by the executive branch.95 This delay
occurred notwithstanding the fact that the case was decided on an expedited
basis and at a threshold stage. If a court had been required to reach the
merits of the dispute, possible discovery and other procedural wrangling un-
doubtedly would have dragged the case on even longer. In addition, any
appeals of the district court decision would have caused still further delays.
Finally, even if expedited proceedings were a panacea for these problems
of delay, it is not realistic to believe that a simple statutory expediting provi-
sion adequately would accomplish its intended goal. The statute books con-
tained over eighty such expediting provisions96 until Congress recognized
the futility of blanket expediting provisions in 1984, when it passed legisla-
tion removing almost all such provisions from the books. 97
94. What is clear is that the Justice Department finds § 192 prosecutions of certain execu-
tive branch officials repugnant. In papers filed in the Burford case, the Department attempted
to erect a sweeping constitutional construct that Burford could not even be prosecuted be-
cause: (1) she acted upon instructions of the President; (2) the Attorney General counseled her
-not to comply with the subpoena; and (3) prosecution would place a "heavy burden" upon the
assertion of executive privilege. Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra note 56, at 36 & n.**.
It is far from certain whether Burford would be able to defend against criminal charges by
arguing that she was merely following the President's orders. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d
606, 611-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("official authorization" may, at times, be a defense to criminal
charges). Compare United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(separate opinion of Wilkey, J.) (defendant claiming defense must "show that his reliance was
objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances of his case") (emphasis omitted);
and id. at 955 (separate opinion of Merhige, J.) (official authorization defense available "if, and
only if, an individual (1) reasonably, on the basis of an objective standard, (2) relies on a
(3) conclusion or statement of law (4) issued by an official charged with interpretation, admin-
istration, and/or enforcement responsibilities in the relevant legal field"); with id. at 957-73
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) (totally rejecting such a defense in context of Watergate proceed-
ings). Although the presidential directive clearly placed Burford in an unenviable position, she
nevertheless retained the ultimate option of resigning her cabinet position if she viewed the
directive as unacceptable. See Hearing, supra note 68, at 59 (remarks of Rep. Levitas) (refer-
ring to resignation of William Ruckelshaus during Watergate era).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 52-87.
96. See H.R. REP. No. 985, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5779, 5785.
97. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 401, 98 Stat. 3335,
3356 (1984) (removing over 80 expediting provisions from scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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It is, on the other hand, well established that federal courts resolve crimi-
nal matters much more expeditiously than civil cases. 98 More importantly,
an underlying premise of our criminal laws is that such laws deter criminal
behavior.99 If, indeed, the threat of eventual criminal prosecution deters ex-
ecutive branch officials from raising insubstantial privilege claims, the need
for time consuming litigation would be obviated.
That criminal sanctions may be severe in cases involving a good faith priv-
ilege claim is undoubtedly a factor lurking behind proposals to replace the
current criminal contempt system with a civil enforcement mechanism in
executive/legislative conflicts. " The emphasis upon the severity of the
criminal contempt proceeding, however, ignores the substantial safeguards
built into the present system. The District of Columbia Circuit has de-
scribed the present system as "an orderly and often approved means of vin-
dicating constitutional claims arising from a legislative investigation."'
' 01
The court correctly pointed out that a reluctant witness may not even be
certified by Congress as in contempt until his or her privilege claims are
rejected by a subcommittee, committee, and eventually the full House or
Senate.' °2 It is only at that point that an indictment or information is
sought which, if issued, means that the witness still will have the opportunity
for court review of the privilege claim.' 03
Any assumption that Congress will not take seriously a bona fide assertion
of executive privilege is simply unwarranted.' The civil enforcement pro-
posals err too far on the side of protecting legitimate claims of privilege with-
out recognizing that a more serious threat is the assertion of unsupportable
The Act specifically repealed a statutory provision that purported to give priority to civil ac-
tions seeking enforcement of Senate subpoenas. See id. § 402(29)(D), at 3359 (repealing 28
U.S.C. § 1364(c) (1982)). In place of these specific expediting provisions, the Act added a
general section allowing expedition in any case for "good cause." See 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a)
(Supp. 11 1984).
98. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 129 (1984) (indicating that federal courts resolved criminal felony
cases an average of between two and five months faster than civil cases during the period 1979-
1984).
99. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (1978).
100. See Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 10, at 151. Of course, a private citizen with a
good faith privilege defense to a congressional subpoena, or at least a House subpoena is placed
in the same conundrum. The civil enforcement proposals do not address the predicament. See
supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
101. Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Cf Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707
(1985) (arguing that members of Congress have the duty and ability to consider constitutional
issues raised by proposed legislation).
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privilege claims which obstruct and delay congressional investigations."0 5
IV. STRENGTHENING THE PRESENT SYSTEM
We have demonstrated in Part III why the current congressional con-
tempt system is preferable to a civil enforcement mechanism. In order for
the current system to be efficacious with respect to legislative/executive con-
flicts, however, there are at least two issues that need to be addressed. First,
a major sticking point in the Burford controversy involved the extent to
which the prosecutor was legally bound to present the case to a grand jury
once Congress had certified the witness in contempt.10 6 The second issue
that must be addressed is the conflict that arises when an executive branch
prosecutor is directed by a House of Congress to seek indictment of a high-
ranking official claiming executive privilege."0 7 These issues will be dis-
cussed in turn.
In the Burford controversy, the executive branch relied heavily upon the
argument that it had absolute discretion to decide whether a congressional
contempt citation should be presented to a grand jury.'o8 The principal case
relied upon to support this absolute discretion, however, does not bear the
weight placed upon it.'" 9 Instead, the better argument is that section 194
105. Such a threat is by no means speculative. The disrespect for the congressional con-
tempt statute engendered by the Justice Department's groundless Burford suit unfortunately
spawned progeny. When another EPA official subsequently was subpoenaed to testify before a
different House subcommittee, she declined even to appear and instead filed an unfounded suit
patterned after the Department's complaint, which she subsequently dismissed voluntarily.
See House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Proceedings Against Rita M. Lavelle, H.R.
REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1983).
106. See Hearing, supra note 68, at 49-50.
107. Such a conflict, while not necessarily inevitable, see supra note 49 (citing cases in
which executive branch officials claiming executive privilege have been prosecuted for con-
tempt of Congress), is nevertheless a serious possibility.
108. See Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra note 56, at 34-35.
109. The Justice Department relied, see id. at 35, upon dictum from a D.C. Circuit case
wherein the court stated its "aware[ness]" that "the Executive Branch ... may decide not to
present the [contempt citation] to the grand jury (as occurred in the case of the officials of the
New York Port Authority)." Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 754 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Others have correctly pointed out that the court's language in Ansara is somewhat mysterious
in view of the fact that there does not appear to be any such Port Authority case in which
grand jury presentment failed to occur following congressional referral. See Hamilton &
Grabow, supra note 10, at 154 n.58. More importantly, virtually all other cases are of the view
that grand jury presentment is mandatory following congressional referral. See. e.g., United
States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126, 136 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'don other grounds, 255 F.2d 899
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958); Ex parte Frankfield, 32 F. Supp. 915, 916
(D.D.C. 1940); see also Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 10, at 154; Lee, Executive Privilege,
Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial Review.: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some
Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 257; Sky, supra note 35, at 401.
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requires that all witnesses cited by a House of Congress for contempt and
referred to the United States Attorney be brought before the grand jury.'
It was further argued by the Executive Branch during the Burford contro-
versy that Congress could not constitutionally interfere with the Executive's
prosecutorial discretion in determining what cases to bring before a grand
jury.' There are serious questions, however, as to whether the Executive
Branch truly exercised prosecutorial discretion in the Burford matter.' 12 In
a more general vein, constitutional claims of prosecutorial discretion are, in
any event, unpersuasive in this context. As recently stated by a leading com-
mentator, article II of the Constitution1 13 "is a duty, not a license; it imposes
an obligation on the President to enforce duly enacted laws." '114 Even as-
110. Section 194 provides that the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House shall
certify the fact of contempt to the United States Attorney "whose duty it shall be to bring the
matter before the grand jury for its action." The word "shall" in statutes generally is inter-
preted by the courts as imposing a mandatory duty upon the executive branch. See, e.g., Com-
munity Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-58 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2360
(1986); but see Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1658 (1985) (dictum suggesting that use of
word "shall" in typical criminal provision does not by itself require prosecution of every statu-
tory violation); Hearing, supra note 68, at 28 (copy of Harris letter arguing that congressional
"contempt statute is like any other criminal statute passed by Congress"). Outside the con-
gressional contempt field, however, Congress does not typically, after a full vote by the affected
House, certify matters to the United States Attorney for prosecution. Furthermore, the typical
criminal statute does not contain language stating that the United States Attorney has a "duty
... to bring" cases before the grand jury.
111. Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra note 56, at 34-35 & n.**.
112. "Prosecutorial discretion" concerns, inter alia, a determination to decline prosecution
where no substantial federal interest would be served, the putative defendant is subject to
prosecution in another jurisdiction, or there exists an adequate noncriminal alternative.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 5-14
(July 1980). Among the factors that a prosecutor may consider are the likelihood of convic-
tion, the choice of a strong case to test uncertain law, the degree of criminality, the weight of
evidence, precedent, policy, the climate of public opinion, and the gravity of the offense. See
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967). The
elements of the congressional contempt statute are not difficult or complicated to prove, and
none of the factors identified by the courts as relevant to the exercise of discretion were pres-
ent. On the contrary, the only articulated reasons for the bold and unequivocal refusal of the
Justice Department to proceed was that prosecution would impose a "heavy burden" upon the
assertion of executive privilege. Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra note 56, at 35 n.**.
This is hardly the exercise of discretion; it is simply a variation upon the theory that any
executive official following orders is excused from the obligation to respond to valid congres-
sional demands.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This "take care" provision of article II was the constitu-
tional provision relied upon by the Justice Department in Burford in support of its
prosecutorial discretion argument. See Plaintiff's Points & Authorities, supra note 56, at 34
n.**.
114. Suntein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653,
670 (1985); see also id. ("the 'take care' clause does not authorize the executive to fail to
enforce those laws of which it disapproves").
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suming that Congress could not constitutionally interfere with the Execu-
tive's prosecutorial discretion based upon the individualized facts of a given
case (an assumption that itself is far from clear),"' there should be little
doubt as to the constitutionality of a statutory scheme constraining the Ex-
ecutive's discretion over broad categories of cases. 1 6 It is constitutionally
permissible, therefore, for Congress to decree that every person cited by a
House of Congress for contempt be brought before a grand jury.
It should be noted, however, that arguments as to whether section 192
imposes a mandatory duty upon the United States Attorney and, if so,
whether it is constitutional, ultimately generate a lot of heat but very little
light. Even if section 192 technically imposes such a duty, there is, under
the current system, no practical way of enforcing it. The existence of a man-
damus action,1 7 in which the United States Attorney could be compelled to
institute grand jury proceedings, is at best unclear."' More importantly,
even if the United States Attorney could be compelled to bring the case
before a grand jury, it would be virtually impossible to ensure that good faith
efforts were made to see that an indictment was returned. 1 9 Finally, it may
well be that the United States Attorney could refuse to sign an indictment
115. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), a decision holding the legislative veto uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on whether Congress could pass legis-
lation overriding executive branch decisions to deport individual aliens. See id. at 935 n.9.
116. Indeed, such is the clear import of Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975),
wherein the Court held that the Secretary of Labor had an absolute duty to file a civil suit to
set aside a union election if certain statutorily specified factors were present. See id. at 567 n.7
(agreeing with lower court that Labor Secretary did not enjoy "an unreviewable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion"); see also supra notes 110, 114, and accompanying text. The most
pertinent examples may be the impoundment controversies of the early 1970's, during which
courts uniformly rejected the President's claim that he had the constitutional authority to
refuse to spend funds that Congress had mandated be spent. See generally Mikva & Hertz,
Impoundment of Funds-The Courts, The Congress, and The President: A Constitutional Tri-
angle, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 335 (1974).
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.,
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (holding that "courts are not to interfere with the free
exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over
criminal prosecutions"). Of course, if it is determined that the United States Attorney has no
discretion to decline to bring congressional contempt cases before a grand jury, see supra notes
108-10 and accompanying text, the Cox rationale against mandamus may be inapposite. Even
so, mandamus would not be a viable remedy in congressional contempt cases in light of the
delay that would be engendered. Furthermore, it may be somewhat inconsistent for a House
of Congress to institute a mandamus suit while at the same time arguing, as was done in the
Burford case, that the flip-side of a mandamus action (i.e., a declaratory judgment action by
the Executive) is improper. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 68, at 12.
119. See Hearing, supra note 68, at 36 (testimony of United States Attorney Harris) ("I
could have gone through the charade, for example, of starting to present it to a grand jury and
then just withholding everything.").
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even if one was returned. 2 ° Therefore, additional legislation is needed to
preserve the viability of the congressional contempt statute in the face of
executive recalcitrance. The ideal solution would be to amend title VI of the
Ethics in Government Act121 to provide for court 12 2 appointment of in-
dependent counsel whenever Congress votes a contempt citation against a
high-ranking executive official. That act, which currently provides for ap-
pointment of independent counsel whenever there is specific evidence of
criminal wrongdoing by certain executive branch officials, 1 23 has now been
applied in a number of instances without successful challenge to its constitu-
tionality.' 2 4 The enactment of such legislation would remove United States
attorneys from the political line of fire which may result when Congress cites
an executive branch official for cont:mpt.
125
Legislation along these lines was in fact proposed during the 98th Con-
gress. One bill, introduced by Representative Frank and others, would have
amended the Ethics in Government Act to require that the Attorney
General
apply to the division of the court for the appointment of an in-
dependent counsel within five days after the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, acting pursuant to section 194 of title 2 of the
United States Code, has certified to the appropriate United States
attorney that any [high-ranking executive branch official 12 6 ] has
120. See Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (5th Cir. 1965) ("If the [United States] attorney refuses to
sign, as he has the discretionary power of doing, we conclude there is no valid indictment.").
121. Pub. L. No. 95-521, title VI, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 591-598; id. § 49; id. §§ 528-529 (1982)).
122. The Ethics in Government Act vests appointment authority in a special panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 593 (1982). Such a
procedure is consonant with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879).
123. The Act applies to the President and Vice-President, cabinet-level officers, certain
White House and Justice Department officials, and other high-ranking government or presi-
dential campaign officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1982).
124. See Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics In Government Act of 1978: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter Special Prosecutor Hearings].
Although certain Attorneys General have at one time or another sought to raise doubts re-
garding the Act's constitutionality, the majority and better view is in favor of constitutionality.
See Kramer & Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals for 1983, 66 MINN. L. REV. 963,
973-83 (1982); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 99, § 4-10, at 192 n.4 (1978).
125. See Hearing, supra note 68, at 50 (testimony of United States Attorney Harris) ("I feel
a little bit as though I am a nonvolunteer player in a play called-well, 'Is It Half Empty or
Half Full?' subtitled, 'The U.S. Attorney is Damned If He Does and Damned If He
Doesn't.' ").
126. The bill defined the class of covered officials as those persons "described in § 591(b) of
[28 U.S.C.] or any person compensated at or above a rate equivalent to level V of the Executive
Schedule under section 5316 of title 5 ...." H.R. 2684, § 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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been found in contempt of Congress. 127
The bill further made clear the duty of this independent counsel to bring the
case promptly "before the grand jury for its action and to prosecute any
indictments resulting therefrom." 128 A similar bill was introduced in the
99th Congress. 129
A separate bill introduced in the 98th Congress would have amended the
congressional contempt statute to clarify that "[t]he duty of the United
States attorney [under 2 U.S.C. § 194] is nondiscretionary and shall be car-
ried out not later than sixty days after the date on which the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
makes the certification."' 30 This bill is somewhat flawed because it is doubt-
ful, for reasons previously discussed,131 that a recalcitrant United States At-
torney can be compelled to bring an effective and good faith prosecution. As
former Senate Watergate Chief Committee Counsel Samuel Dash has stated,
"the Attorney General, an appointee of the President and usually a close
political ally of the President, simply cannot be depended upon to forcefully
prosecute the assistants of the President, or high executive officials in the
Government."1
32
The better means for Congress to enforce its investigative demands against
the President, therefore, is through the current congressional contempt pro-
cedure augmented by an independent counsel mechanism. It should be
noted, however, that there are cases where Congress need not invoke con-
tempt procedures in order to perform its legislative role. Thus, for example,
during the recent controversy involving the President's short-lived refusal to
divulge certain documents arguably relevant to the nomination of William
Rehnquist as Chief Justice, 13 3 there was no need for the Senate Judiciary
Committee to resort to a contempt mechanism. Instead, the Committee
quite simply could have refused to recommend confirmation of Chief Justice
Rehnquist to his new position unless and until the President divulged the
materials at issue. 134 There are nevertheless situations (the Burford case be-
127. Id.
128. Id. § 3.
129. H.R. 3836, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
130. H.R. 3456, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
131. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
132. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 124, at 69.
133. See supra note 7.
134. In 1973, Senator Ervin, then Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, delayed consider-
ation of and held hostage President Nixon's nomination of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney
General until the President agreed to allow Peter Flanagan, a White House staff assistant, to
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ing the prime example) where such a political power play is untenable and
the last resort is contempt of Congress.' 35 It is for these situations that the
independent counsel mechanism is necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
The Burford controversy dramatized that the current system of congres-
sional contempt may suffer a serious breakdown when the contemnor is a
high-ranking executive branch official. Proposals for replacing the existing
criminal enforcement mechanism with a civil process, however, unjustifiably
fail to recognize that a civil process would engender unnecessary delay and
frivolous privilege claims which would thwart the congressional need for
timely information. A better solution would be to retain the present system
supplemented with a mechanism providing for appointment of independent
counsel in cases where high-ranking executive branch officials have been
cited for contempt by Congress. It is only in this way that the ability of
Congress to obtain necessary and timely information from executive branch
officials effectively may be preserved.
135. Congress conceivably could, of course, use its appropriations authority to enforce its
investigative demands against the executive branch in virtually every case. For example, in the
Burford case, Congress could have refused to appropriate any more EPA funds until the Presi-
dent divulged the Superfund enforcement materials at issue. The inefficacy of this appropria-
tions weapon, however, is apparent: Congress would be crippling the very programs its
oversight was intended to strengthen.
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